One mission, several meanings
For analysts, if the proposed EU mission is given the go-ahead, there will be a number of meanings, notably:
A) Preventing the destabilisation scenario from happening
Since 2002, the UN estimates that 200,000 people have been killed, and more than 2 million displaced as a result of on-going violence in the Darfur region. The conflict has spread beyond Sudan and now holds very serious regional implications. For instance, in attempts to escape from the Janjaweed militias, around 400,000 Sudanese refugees are living in Chad with a further 300,000 in the north-eastern province of CAR. In spite of massive international assistance, this flow of refugees is very difficult to handle for these two fragile States (clashes between refugees and nationals have been reported). Moreover, Chad and CAR are being destabilised by armed rebellions operating from Sudan through groups such as the Front for Democratic Change, Union Forces for Democracy and Development, Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, etc.
In 2006, issues flared when rebels took Abéché, the capital of eastern Chad, for two days. They were forced to retreat only after the Chad army got the logistical and intelligence support of the French troops based in the country. Unable to prevent armed groups from crossing and looting the northern part of CAR, President François Bozizé has also requested the help of France. At the beginning of this year, French Special Forces were operating in the northern part of the country and clashed with rebels groups. Therefore, if it happens, the EU military mission is intended to manage the regional consequences of the Darfur conflict and not the Darfur conflict itself.
B) Revealing UN and AU weak capacity
This mission also reveals the extent of the UN and African Union (AU) failure in dealing with the Darfur crisis. Both organisations have a mission in Sudan but with different mandates and different human capacity, resulting in serious coordination problems. Approached last year, the UN said they did not have the financial resources to deploy a full-scale mission and they approached the EU to do the job. Like in the DRC, the EU is acting as a substitute for the UN-DPO. This was very much a replication of the 2003 and 2006 Congolese scenario, but in Sudan this time. Actually, despite the recent agreement about the hybrid UN/AU force, the EU military mission is regarded as a necessity because the deployment pace of such a force will be slow.
The request for the EU military mission also results from the poor record of the 7,000 peacekeepers of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). They have not been able to prevent the large-scale violence against civilians, on-going human rights violations, and numerous violations of the ceasefire. According to various analysts, the AMIS is dysfunctional in many ways, including being ill-equipped and managing a poor supply chain in a huge territory. While the AMIS was a test case for the EU/AU relationship (the mission was financed by the EU at the cost of € 265 million), the effectiveness of the AMIS is not questioned any more, it is now considered as very poor and not at all cost-effective. As a result, after paying the bill, the EU is now asked to directly intervene - a serious setback for the "Africanisation" of conflict management in Africa.
C) Asserting European dynamics
This mission is also showing the convergence of two trends, namely the continuous building-up of a European military capacity, and the "Europeanisation" of the French policy in Africa. The Balkan wars in the 1990’s made European leaders realise that they needed a military capacity in order to deal with conflicts in Europe and elsewhere. Since then, the EU is busy asserting itself as a military actor. The "Europeanisation" of French policy in Africa is especially obvious in the defence sector. Drawing lessons from the very damaging Côte d’Ivoire intervention, Paris is moving away from unilateral military action and is trying to mobilise the other European countries that are sensitive to the issues of peace and security in Africa. Like Artemis and Eufor, this new EU military mission is likely to have a strong French army component.
Behind the European consensus
It was not difficult in July to get the 27 European countries to agree to the idea of a military operation for managing the Darfur crisis. This is presently the most pressing humanitarian crisis and the regional collateral damages are now obvious. However, while the feasibility study aspect of this military mission is just starting, some voices in European diplomatic and NGO circles have been critical for two reasons, namely:
1) The participation of Chad under President Idriss Deby is not regarded as reliable. Like Deby’s Sudanese counterpart, he had already agreed to the deployment of AU and UN troops in Chad, but subsequently refused. European diplomats are worried that he will do this again at the last minute. Negotiating with Deby has already proven to be difficult, as he is insisting on a French force (and not a European one) and is solely interested in securing the Sudan/Chad border. However, as certain parties point out, Deby’s special relationship with Paris should help in this regard; and
2) Despite being supportive of this new development, European NGOs have already warned that this could be a French military mission in European disguise. They suspect Paris of being interested in securing long-term allies in the region (Deby and Bozizé) and saving their undemocratic and bad-governance orientated regimes.