The world-renowned international relations scholar Hans J. Morgenthau in his seminal work Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace written nearly 41 years ago provided valuable insights into the current debate facing security analysts across the spectrum. In his core argument Morgenthau stresses the importance of diplomacy as an element of national power and as well as for the preservation of international peace as a particular aspect of that general function. Morgenthau continues by stressing that a diplomacy that ends in war has failed in its primary objective - namely the promotion of the national interest by peaceful means . The task of diplomacy is therefore said to be fourfold. Firstly diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. Secondly diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives. Thirdly, diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other and finally diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives.

A nation will also invite war if its diplomacy wrongly assesses the objectives of other nations and the power at their disposal. Furthermore as for the assessment of the power of other nations, either to overrate or to underrate it may equally be fatal to the cause of peace. A nation that wants to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy cannot cease comparing its own objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light of their compatibility.

It is the final task of an intelligent diplomacy, intent upon preserving peace, to choose the appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. The means at the disposal of diplomacy are threefold: persuasion, compromise, and the threat of force. No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both intelligent and peaceful. No diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion and compromise deserves to be called intelligent. Rarely, if ever, in the conduct of the foreign policy of a great power is there justification for using only one method to the exclusion of the others. Generally, the diplomatic machinery of a great power, in order to be able to serve both interests of the country and the interests of peace, must at the same time use persuasion, hold out the advantages of a compromise, and impress the other side with the military strength of his country.

These arguments held forth by Morgenthau are of particular interest and highly applicable in assessing the much heralded creation of the Pentagon’s New Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the ultimate role it will occupy in advancing the interests of the United States on the African continent.

PEACEMAKER - DEFINING AFRICOM’S ROLE

The most salient role (that has been stressed from the outset by key US policymakers) that has been accorded to AFRICOM is its objective of developing a stable environment on the continent to promote civil society and improved quality of life for the people of Africa.

Ryan Henry, Principal Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, in a Pentagon news conference where the creation of AFRICOM was announced in February 2007, furthermore stressed that “this command will focus on some efforts to reduce conflict, to improve the security environment, to defeat or preclude the development of terrorists or terrorist networks, and support in crisis response,”

According to Henry, AFRICOM will integrate the Department of Defence efforts in Africa, which are currently split among three combatant commands - a move which will enable more cooperation with other US Government agencies, such as the State Department. “It is a continent and a group of nations who think of themselves from a continental perspective; they think of themselves as Africa,” he said. “One of the major reasons that it’s time to stand up Africa Command is for us to view the people, the nations and the continent of Africa from the same perspective that they view themselves”.

Many of the missions AFRICOM will perform will be non-kinetic, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Army Lt. Gen. Walter Sharp, Director of the Joint Staff, said at the news conference. AFRICOM will have a strong emphasis on building the capacity of African nations through training and equipping African militaries, conducting training and medical missions on the continent, and supporting regional organisations like the African Union, he said.

AFRICOM will also be responsible for any necessary military action in Africa, Sharp said. He emphasised that although non-kinetic missions will be important, military responsibilities are not the last priority for AFRICOM, because it will be a combatant command.

The motivation behind creating AFRICOM was the increasing importance of Africa strategically, diplomatically and economically, Navy Rear Adm. Robert Moeller, Executive Director of the US Africa Command implementation planning team, said in an interview. Henry furthermore said AFRICOM will emphasise humanitarian assistance, civic action, military professionalism, border and maritime security assistance, and response to natural disasters.

“This command also has the responsibility…to do whatever military operations that the Secretary (of Defence) and the President direct”, Sharp said. “So it is a combatant command plus, the plus meaning what we’re able to hopefully be able to garner together for the interagency coordination from the very beginning”.

The creation of a fully operational African Command by the United States comes at opportune time when Africa faces a growing threat of poverty, underdevelopment, conflict and the threat of international terrorism in certain countries.

It is the final task of an intelligent diplomacy, intent upon preserving peace, to choose the appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. The means at the disposal of diplomacy are threefold: persuasion, compromise, and the threat of force. The United States has therefore adopted an intelligent approach by realising that dealing with Africa’s crises require more than just brute military force, but in fact demands a measured and calculated response to deal with any potential threats on the African continent albeit directly or indirectly related to security. Therefore the African continent possesses a plethora of military and non-military threats to security that require an equally serious response if and when required to do so. The architects of AFRICOM thus appear to have taken cognisance of this important fact and have decided to adopt a three-pronged approach to approaching the vast problems that continue to bedevil the continent’s fortunes.
Admittedly Henry told reporters that the purpose of AFRICOM was not to wage war, but to work in concert with its African partners for a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place. Perhaps the most interesting and puzzling dimension of AFRICOM in this regard is that no new US troops will be deployed to the continent and no new military bases will be established on the continent when the command becomes fully operational in 2008. Therefore it comes into being with military-related objectives, but with apparently no visible instruments or means, apart from a few administrative nodes to serve a continent that spans a large geographic area, each with specific problems, crises and needs. Therefore AFRICOM as it is presented in its present format will merely be incorporated as a subsidiary of sorts for existing US operations on the continent. If the US is realising the strategic importance of Africa, merely redrawing the organisational chart will denude AFRICOM of its potentially significant role it can play on the continent as a command structure in its own right.

Yet from further statements that were issued alongside those highlighting the dual character the new command will have to assume and multiple roles it will have to play, it is also clear that military operations are therefore not entirely ruled out in the architecture of AFRICOM either.

This is a prudent approach, one that only falters in the lack of the creation of a credible permanent US standby force ready to be deployed if and when it becomes necessary to resort to military action. Invariably, this will be the case, and enough proof of violent conflict exists on the African continent to warrant the permanent deployment of some form of visible troop presence, most notably in those areas where peace, stability and national security have all but disintegrated in the face of war and civil strife.

The Pentagon has attempted to place greater adherence to the notion that greater military attention to pre-conflict situations - preventive action - could pay huge dividends, by making it unnecessary to use US troops around the world. According to the Pentagon, the command's primary mission will be "shaping" activities designed to ameliorate troubling trends before they reach a crisis, rather than traditional operations involving the use of force. Though focused on conflict prevention, even this stated objective will require some form of military approach and military presence in order to monitor and enforce peace once order and stability have been restored.

While the importance of conflict prevention should not be counted out of the equation, it is highly unlikely that attempting to solely adopt this approach without some form of military contingency plan in place will be beneficial to US interests, especially on the African continent in the present climate of conflict that has gripped large parts, threatening to engulf entire states and regions into civil war. Recent calls for greater deployments of peacekeeping forces by the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) in strife torn areas and conflict hotspots all point to the trend that while conflict prevention is the ideal, it is rarely the reality when conflict situations do spiral out of control. Even after conflict has been addressed and peace agreements signed, the presence of peacekeepers continue in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Indeed there are important lessons to be learnt from the present scramble by Africa to come to terms with the stark realisation that the continent is being perceived as a haven for terrorists, troublemakers and lawlessness.

AFRICOM’S MISSION AND MANDATE - LESSONS FROM AFRICA

A number of current trends all point to the need to augment humanitarian and so-called non-kinetic approaches to conflict and strife-torn areas, especially in African countries where conflict and insecurity threaten the entire social fabric of society. Importantly African states have taken the lead in advancing the need for a more coordinated attempt to address threats to national and regional security. For it to be successful AFRICOM will have to devise a strategy that could play a more constructive and continuously engaged role in supporting these critical peace restoration strategies that are presently being undertaken.
In June 2007 defence chiefs and ministers from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania agreed to form a joint inter-state defence and security institutional mechanism to address cross-cutting defence and security issues in the region. The decision was reached at a high-level meeting of the East African Community (EAC) sectoral council on cooperation and defence matters. During the same conference the defence ministers also agreed to adopt a common and united stance against the potential threat of further terrorist attacks in the region. The security and economic threat violence continues to pose in the volatile Niger Delta could ultimately prompt the Nigerian Government to seek regional (and possibly even international assistance) if the situation spirals further out of control.

The start of August 2007 heralded important developments in addressing the lack of peace and security in Sudan’s Darfur region. Critical developments in this region have also led to important lessons to be learnt in dealing with future conflict situations on the African continent.

The UN Security Council authorised up to 26,000 troops and police for Darfur and approved the use of force to protect civilians in Sudan's arid western region. The combined "hybrid" UN-AU operation aims to quell violence in Darfur, where more than 2.1 million people have been driven into camps and an estimated 200,000 have died over the past four years. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who conducted months of talks with Khartoum, described the unanimously approved resolution as "historic and unprecedented" and said the mission would "make a clear and positive difference". The resolution, number 1769, invokes Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, under which the Organisation can authorise force. The measure allows the use of force for self-defence, to ensure the free movement of humanitarian workers and to protect civilians under attack, but acknowledges Sudan's sovereignty.

The commitment on the part of African nations towards this 26,000 strong force was met by Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Egypt, Cameroon and Ethiopia - a move welcomed by Said Djinnit, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, who noted that the joint UN/AU initiative “will absorb a smaller AU force that has failed to quell the violence".

The concept of shared responsibility between the UN and some regional organisations is one of the most important innovations in the management of international security in the post-Cold War era for the effective management of conflicts within the regions of the world. Africa is at the forefront of efforts to formalise the relationship between the UN and a regional organisation, in this case the AU, with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts. At the same time, the deterioration of security in Africa, especially the rise in the number and intensity of internal conflicts, led to a re-opening of the debate on the need for a continental security agenda.

This led to the creation of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG), which was launched on the occasion of the SADC Heads of State and Government Summit held recently.

The purpose of SADCBRIG is to participate in Missions as envisaged in Article 13 section “Mandate” of the Protocol Establishing the PSC of the AU that includes performing the functions which are:

1. Observation and monitoring missions;
2. Other types of peace support missions;
3. Intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
4. Preventive deployment in order to prevent 9[i] a dispute or a conflict from escalating, [ii] an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or States, and [iii] the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement
5. Peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation;
6. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
7. Any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or Assembly.

The SADC Brigade is set to join the hybrid AU/UN force in Sudan's Darfur region, with the African Standby Force forming part of the 26,000 members.

AFRICOM - PREVENTION VERSUS CURE

It therefore becomes increasingly difficult to support the argument that it would be unlikely that the US will redirect meaningful war-fighting capability to the African theatre. The US will, in certain respects, have to engage in seeking solutions to Africa’s complex and protracted crises, even if it does so only in providing essential and visible support to other regional initiatives. Therefore it is premature to preclude that AFRICOM will not have to perform some form of visible military function or will seek to prevent itself from becoming involved in at least some degree in addressing Africa’s notorious intractable conflicts. If the architects and stewards of AFRICOM envision shaping the African environment, they will have to at least play some form of constructive role in undermining those elements that have sought to compromise and destroy it. As such, AFRICOM can equally be a useful instrument in both preventing conflicts, adopting some form of peace enforcement role in potential conflict hotspots on the continent and assisting African countries in devising remedial efforts that will herald a return to peace and stability in the long run.

Due to this, AFRICOM, as it plans and devises its future options and strategies on the continent, will have to consider the possibility that in order to construct a stable, secure and peaceful environment where democracy, good governance and economic prosperity will be able to flourish in Africa, it will on certain occasions be obliged and called upon to also make use of its military capability to defend and protect African states from rebel groups, armed militias and criminal gangs who act with impunity. To tackle these problems will require a capable military force, ready to deploy in the event of chaos and anarchy.

From the aforementioned arguments it appears increasingly clear that AFRICOM will have to adopt a more complex and tailor-made approach in dealing with the intricacies that Africa will present. The US will have to adopt a multiple array of instruments to address the plethora of challenges that faces Africa and attempting to accord greater weight and importance to one over the other will be detrimental in achieving the stated objectives of AFRICOM. As such, the instruments will have to play complimentary roles. Military approaches and military action will in certain instances form an unavoidable, yet crucial part of ensuring that the overall strategy of restoring peace and stability to certain African countries succeeds.

Therefore AFRICOM must ensure that the use of military force is utilised as a means to achieve crucial and commendable ends in the service of peace, wherein it serves to bolster and supports efforts to create a secure and stable environment and should avoid at all costs that the use of force becomes an end in itself to achieve other more subjective and narrow self-interests. This is of particular importance in terms of its objectives related to countering terrorism on the continent.

THE COUNTER-TERROR CONUNDRUM - WHAT ROLE FOR AFRICOM?

The puzzling aspect is that the new command is reportedly not being toted as a tool to be utilised in counter-terrorism initiatives - clearly one of the priority areas since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 (and since US operations were conducted earlier in April 2007 off the coast of East Africa, targeting suspected Al-Qaeda militants hiding in Somalia, who were allegedly involved in the 1998 embassy attacks). During initial briefings it was stressed that terrorism is a problem in Africa and it is something African nations are very concerned about. But "it is clearly not the primary focus" of AFRICOM, which has no intention of committing troops or bases to the continent to pursue terrorists.

In what appears to contradict the aforementioned statement, the briefings stressed that Africa is becoming a significant area to the United States. It is important that Africa in general, and the Horn of Africa specifically, are stable. The population is growing and there is a lot of poverty and disease. This is a fertile breeding ground for terrorists. The goal of the African Command is to reduce conflict and improve security in the area. The African Command will be responsible for defeating terrorist networks.

Dr Wafula Okumu Head of the Africa Security Analysis Programme of the Institute for Security Studies based in South Africa recently interrogated the pros and cons of the envisaged AFRICOM. One of the core mission objectives of AFRICOM as discussed by Okumu is the prevention of conflict by promoting stability regionally and eventually to “prevail over extremism” by never letting its seeds germinate in Africa and addressing underdevelopment and poverty, which are making Africa a fertile ground for breeding terrorists.

It is clear from these lofty objectives that the US would also have to adopt and reassess its approach in terms of the overall war against international terrorism, especially if it seeks to win the hearts and minds of African leaders and more importantly Africa’s population.

Okumu furthermore highlights the fact that terrorism has been identified as one of the biggest threats to these interests. AFRICOM is expected to stop terrorists being bred in Africa's weak, failing and failed states from attacking these interests. It is widely held in the West that failing and failed states in Africa create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Among the targets of these terrorists are Western interests such as oil sources and supply routes. Improvement of African security would inevitably promote US national interests by making it less likely that the continent could be a source of terrorism against the United States.

A great sense of reluctance to embrace the concept of AFRICOM exists, even though there are analysts that state the obvious that there is already a substantial American presence on the continent that will now only be formalised within a more bureaucratic structure that is AFRICOM. Yet this does not put African observers or analysts at ease. Okumu stresses that Africans continue to adopt a wary approach towards the advent of AFRICOM as this could formalise the militarisation of US-African relations, whereby the Pentagon would be taking the lead role in the promotion of US interests on the continent. Okumu furthermore stresses that AFRICOM will not only militarise US-African relations but also those African countries in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence of American bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the US and make Americans targets of violence . Therefore the presence of AFRICOM is surely to generate further anti-American sentiments - and is obviously one of the key areas that its architects should carefully consider when the time comes for the command to initiate its operations.

Despite attempting to downplay the significance of the creation of AFRICOM, it yet again raises pertinent questions surrounding the role and presence of the US on the African continent. Furthermore given the debate that is likely to emerge as to whether or not American troops will play a significant and direct role in this command, more questions are likely to be raised in situations if, when and where US strategic interests are directly and blatantly threatened by hostile forces or extremists and terrorists where attacks are successfully carried out against significant US assets and where certain countries are being openly utilised as safe-havens. This will have particular implications for the pre-emptive use of military force where an African country holding openly anti-American sentiments could, in the future, pose according, to US estimates, a specific and imminent military threat. In this worst-case scenario AFRICOM’s role is likely to be minimal at best and sidelined.

While US military engagement on the African continent is by no means a novelty, the nature of the engagement and the manner in which it will be presented to a less than receptive African audience will be pivotal to whether or not AFRICOM will succeed or not. Furthermore much scepticism will continue as the US continues to “sell” AFRICOM as a major departure from its past engagement with Africa. Ultimately Africa’s strategic importance to the US continues to be defined in terms of security objectives that are deemed more urgent and pronounced than ever before.

AFRICOM’s mandate and mission statement is likely to stir further debate as its launch nears. What is clear is that realist conceptions of security and interests are likely to shape and direct the final structure and functions of AFRICOM. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Africa, Theresa Whelan, stresses that since the events of 9/11, combined with 20/20 hindsight, it has become clear that Africa has become integral, not peripheral, to global security in general, and US security in particular . Yet in the same argument raised by Whelan, there is the realisation that African security issues could no longer be viewed as only humanitarian in nature. Cold, hard real-politik dictated a US national interest in promoting a secure and stable African continent. While this appears to be a narrow self-interested view, the US appears ready, willing and able to adopt a holistic approach in recognising the need to promote sustainable security and stability in Africa by assisting the continent to achieve good governance, the rule of law and economic opportunity. These are interests that are likely to conflict on several key junctures and there will be great difficulty in achieving unanimous consensus amongst Africa’s leadership on whether the US is adopting a more altruistic foreign policy abroad or acting in pure self-interest. This is the delicate balance of interests that AFRICOM will have to oversee and reconcile in order to achieve both the almost insurmountable task of creating a stable, peaceful and wholly prosperous African continent and a greater sense of security for the US simultaneously. It will be a mission that will not be accomplished overnight, nor will it be a debate that is likely to reflect a common set of opinions or satisfactory conclusions that will be satisfactory to either side.

In closing, perhaps what the role and mission of AFRICOM will or will not become is best encapsulated in a memorable statement made by then-US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld when he stated:

"Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know".