The US War on Terrorism has become an intricate part of the national strategic doctrine of the US and indeed since the September 11th terrorist attacks terrorism has become arguably the most important focus of the national security strategy of the US. The central focus on terrorism by the George W. Bush Administration dominated the National Security Strategy of 2002:

“The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”

The security strategy was dominated by terrorism and its all-encompassing and highly destructive effect. Virtually every aspect, focus, discussion and objectives as outlined in the document - from the first page until the very last - concentrated on terrorism and its effects and ways and means of combating the scourge. In the context of the devastating attacks and the loss of nearly 3,000 innocent people in the worst terrorist attacks in history, this was again arguably the correct response and line to take. One of the noble ideals set forth in the document was to work with allies to defeat global terrorism and work to protect against attacks on the US and its allies.

Terrorism was rightly condemned alongside crimes against humanity, genocide, slavery and piracy. This condemnation is indeed right, given the severe trauma, anxiety, casualties, chaos and destruction that terrorist attacks leave in their wake.

Regrettably, the US war on terrorism has, since the dawn of the Axis of Evil and the war against Iraq in 2003, dangerously shifted much important focus and attention away from fighting terrorism - the original stated intention as outlined in the National Security Strategy of 2002. While the focus has remained on eliminating terrorism, the diversion has alienated allies and created even more enemies and terrorists willing to support terrorism’s cause. Many enemies have since been identified as potential state sponsors of terrorism, emerging as potential targets for regime change, various individuals have been (in some instances) wrongfully accused and targeted as potential supporters of terrorism and the ideology that the US had so staunchly set out to eliminate has found fertile ground in many, many countries from Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa. Public diplomacy has failed dismally to allay fears by those citizens who find themselves in countries blacklisted as potential terrorist sympathisers, and instead a growing sense of anti-Americanism has taken hold across the world. With sights set on Africa, this fervent anti-Americanism has grown particularly pronounced on the African continent.

This poses particularly vexing problems for the architects of the newly envisioned US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

South Africa’s position on AFRICOM was made clear on the occasion of a Parliamentary Briefing on defence and foreign affairs held in Cape Town. Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, unequivocally stated that SADC Defence Ministers took a decision that the region not agree to host AFRICOM, and in particular, armed forces, since this would have a negative effect. The Defence Minister also stated that the majority of regions in Africa have adopted a similar position and that the decision not to host AFRICOM is based according to his knowledge on a continental position held by the entire African Union. The Minister also issued a stern warning that any country that allowed itself to be a base for the US Strategic Command in Africa would have to live with the consequences. Any decision by an African country to host AFRICOM, could therefore amount to neighbouring African countries refusing to co-operate with them. The Defence Minister’s position is in line with anti-US government sentiments held by a number of cabinet members of the Mbeki Government, particularly following the decision of President George W. Bush to launch a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq in 2003.

AFRICOM has been declared by Africa as persona non grata. It appears to be an issue that (at least from the perceptions of African leaders) to be non-negotiable. The greater coherence that is been sought by US defence planners through the creation of AFRICOM in responding to potential zones of instability in Africa is likely to be especially acutely affected where the US war on terrorism is concerned. The US maintains a particularly vested interest in eliminating terrorism in the vast expanses of the African continent and it appears as if more, not less resources are to be spent on seeing this crucial mission through.

In particular, US initiatives and programmes presently underway appear to contradict the apparent universal refusal to engage in partnerships with the US. Most notably, efforts being undertaken by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative have yielded important partnerships between the US and key African allies. These initiatives are providing far greater utility well beyond mere elimination of terrorists.

African states face a particular challenge as far as terrorism is concerned and in many respects the nature of the threat poses particular complexities of its own.

TERRORISM IN AFRICA

A casual reading of major newspapers would leave one with the impression that terrorists are running rampant across Africa. Terrorists are said to hide out in the multiple lawless and stateless areas that litter the continent; they supposedly gain recruits from among the starving and displaced masses who have been victimised by powerful warlords and Governments that are fighting over the continent’s spoils. Militant Islamic recruiters are thought to prey on vulnerable communities, building militant organisations and recruiting the next generation of suicide bombers from the ranks of the poor Africans. This, according to Piombo (2007), has however been designated as a gross oversimplification of the reality in Africa. Piombo furthermore asserts that prior to 2001, there were no designated “foreign terrorist organisations” in Sub-Saharan Africa. There have been a number of organisations that area Governments label as “terrorists,” yet the United States has been hesitant to recognise the groups as such, for the understandable reason that in many cases, area Governments are labelling opposition groups terrorists in order to gain support to combat their opponents.

Terrorism in Africa is not confined to the realm of radical Islamists, though those are the groups that receive the most attention. Of the three Sub-Saharan groups that have found their way onto the “other designated organisations” lists maintained by the State Department, only one (Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya, AIAI, of Somalia), was Islamist. The other two included the former military of Rwanda (the ex-FAR) and a Christian terrorist group in Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Al-Qaeda, obviously on the list of designated foreign terrorist organisations, operates in Africa, but is not from Africa. The only well known group that now appears to have directly aligned itself with Al-Qaeda is the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, now known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. This terrorist organisation recently carried out yet another deadly attack against an army barracks in the port of Dellys at the start of September 2007. It is also likely that this group (given the inclusion of the Maghreb) is seeking to expand its influence well beyond staging attacks in Algeria alone.

East Africa has attracted special interest from the United States and international community because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) were bombed, killing a handful of US citizens and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. Sudan and Somalia have both served as training grounds and transit routes for Al-Qaeda, and the agents who attacked the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were closely linked to cells in Sudan and Somalia. As recent events in Somalia reveal, it is thought that at least two of these individuals are still hiding out in Somalia. In the wake of the embassy bombings, an organised Al-Qaeda cell was uncovered in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2002, one of Kenya’s most popular tourist destinations, Mombasa, experienced two further terrorist strikes, this time in the form of co-ordinated and simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel popular with Western tourists and an Israeli-chartered aircraft departing from the Mombasa airport.

Despite this permissive environment, the indigenous terrorist threat in much of Africa has not been considered a major threat by the US Government, which focuses almost exclusively on the threat posed by transnational jihadi organisations originating outside Africa. Yet groups like Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah operate alongside a pervasive network of local groups, some of which are affiliated with the transnational organisations, and many of which are not.

Explicit counterterrorism programmes that focus on military assistance are the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), Joint Task force AZTEK SILENCE, and the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). The Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) falls within this category, combining security assistance with humanitarian programmes that aim to combat terrorism, reduce the conditions that lead to terrorism, and win hearts and minds in support of the War on Terror. One particular initiative corresponds to the envisioned role AFRICOM seeks to play in Africa, insofar terrorism is concerned.

TSCTI - THE AMERICANS ARE ALREADY HERE, AND THE AFRICAN’S ARE ALREADY COOPERATING!

In West Africa, the main programmes are the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). The PSI operated between November 2002 and March 2004 with a budget of US$ 7.75 million. It provided Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania with assistance to training and equipment to improve their border security and deny the use of their sovereign territory to terrorists and criminals. PSI was primarily a military initiative run by European Command (EUCOM), and focused on capacity building in the security forces: increasing border control capabilities and in each country creating a rapid reaction force to pursue terrorists.

In 2004-2005, the PSI transitioned into the TSCTI, not only increasing funding and the scope of activities, but also making it an inter-agency endeavour. TSCTI, officially led by the State Department, incorporates the Departments of State, Treasury, Defence and USAID. DoD performs the security assistance functions through EUCOM, and the military portion of TSCTI is called Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). Funding for TSCTI was US$ 16 million for 2005, with plans US $100 million a year for the remaining five years until 2011.

The Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative officially started in June with Exercise Flintlock 2005. US special operations forces trained their counterparts in seven Saharan countries, teaching military tactics critical in enhancing regional security and stability. At the same time, they encouraged the participating nations to work collaboratively toward confronting regional issues.

The overall approach has been straightforward: build indigenous capacity and facilitate cooperation among Governments in the region that are willing partners (Algeria, Chad, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, with Libya possibly to follow later if relations improve) in the struggle with Islamic extremism in the Sahel region.

The Pan-Sahel Initiative and its successor the TSCTI are sterling examples of the role AFRICOM envisions it will play on the African continent (barring the actual deployment of soldiers). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for African Affairs, Teresa Whelan, has yet again reiterated that no new US forces will be deployed to the continent, apart from the present forward operating site based in Djibouti. Whelan also noted that a significant percentage of the command staff would be civilians from other departments such as the US State Department, the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). AFRICOM as a command structure "will have a presence… in the form of staff officers" throughout Africa.

In this respect the TSCTI appears to have been a forerunner to the envisioned operational structure and architecture of AFRICOM.

It would therefore be an incorrect assumption that African states are united in their condemnation of AFRICOM and the presence of the US. The TSCTI appears to have been a relatively successful example of cooperation that has incorporated various segments of the US Government (as envisioned by AFRICOM) in providing much-needed assistance to African states facing security threats from terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda.

The experience of the US in running operations such as the TSCTI is instrumental in building partnerships with African states and serves as a major confidence-building tool. African states that declare themselves unwilling to cooperate (especially in countries threatened by the presence of terrorist organisations) will do so at their own peril.

The US Government on its part should cease its ambiguous approach to AFRICOM and should openly communicate its intentions and operations in Africa, in order to secure the approval and consent of African states that remain reluctant over US intentions.

Therefore the Defence Department continues to adopt a paradoxical policy whereby Assistant Secretary of Defence Whelan notes that "The biggest concern of the DoD is not how to get involved in Africa, but how to stay out of Africa." Given the relative success of the TSCTI it would be detrimental if the US were not to continue operations of this nature in bolstering regional security in Africa, and it would further prove detrimental if African states adopt a hostile stance towards the US in this respect. It would therefore be in both the interests of African states and that of the US to adopt a framework for enhanced cooperation to chart the way forward in responding to mutual security concerns.

Convening a joint US-Africa Defence and Security Cooperation Summit could potentially pave the way for both African states and the US to discuss tensions that continue to cloud relations in order to chart a course for mutual cooperation on defence and security-related matters. As with many partnerships, African states require assistance in battling potential terrorist threats (the TSCTI is a prime example of this), while the US cannot go it alone by adopting a unilateral approach in acting on the African continent either. In establishing AFRICOM the US should also guard in adopting policies to fight terrorism that will lead to the alienation of the local population. The US should also avoid relationships with African states where the regime (safeguarding the security of the Government, to the detriment of its citizens) has adopted repressive policies where opposition movements are labelled as “terrorist organisations” aimed at overthrowing the regime. Worried US allies argue that AFRICOM will only strengthen America's ties with unsavoury regimes - including Ethiopia, who have become US proxies in an expanding civil war in Somalia-by prioritising counter-terror over development and diplomacy.

The crux of what AFRICOM policy on the African continent should possibly be is best described as one of augmenting and assisting the protection of African states’ national security, without directing and dictating the contents of that very policy. In this respect therefore the US should remain engaged and involved in assisting Africa in securing and protecting its internal and external security, while remaining outside of attempts to thwart, influence or undermine national policy. This will prove to be the critical difference on whether the US will be building bridges in Africa or burning them!