Ten African Union (AU) soldiers were killed and 50 were missing after armed men launched an assault on an AU base in Darfur, the worst attack on AU troops since they deployed in Sudan's violent west in 2004. The attack had taken the AU forces by complete shock and surprise and has undoubtedly dealt a severe blow to the mission in Darfur and to the overall morale of the AU troops operating under extreme and difficult circumstances in this region.

This has placed heavy strain amidst the visit by The Elders consisting of South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former US president Jimmy Carter, human rights activist Graça Machel, and peace mediation veteran Lakhdar Brahimi, accompanied by British businessman Richard Branson that are scheduled to visit Darfur and the southern capital Juba.

A joint UN-AU peacekeeping force with 26,000 police and soldiers is due to deploy next year to absorb the AU's 7,000 peacekeepers who, lacking equipment and experience, have struggled to defend even themselves against attack as this incident has brutally shown.

This raises potentially grave implications for the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and whether this arrangement will be able to make an impact in addressing Africa’s conflicts successfully.

The establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council reflected a commitment by African leaders to respond to the major threats posed to Africa’s peace and security. In establishing the Peace and Security Council, AU Member States have clearly indicated that they are willing to take additional concrete steps for peace and security in Africa. In particular, they have signaled their intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace, and again indicated they are ready to accept their share of responsibility for ensuring durable development of the Continent, particularly in the area of peace and security. The ASF will be required to perform functions in respect to observation and monitoring missions, other types of peace support missions, intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, preventive deployment, peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations caught in the middle of severe conflict situations(1).

The speed with which forces will be required to deploy has particular implications as many conflicts in the African theatre can erupt at a moment’s notice and requires a rapid response in order to avoid the onset of major conflict. Timing has been cited as one of the crucial elements in preventing an emerging crisis from erupting into a major war. The Report of the Panel on UN Operations (the Brahimi Report) cites that “the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. The African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) have established long-term deployment targets for the ASF that coincides with UN timelines of possessing the required operational capabilities to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days.

While there appears to be a genuine willingness and readiness to commit to addressing Africa’s plethora of peace and security requirements, the major issue remains whether the continent possess the ability required to commit troops to such a vast and almost insurmountable task.

While the timeline for the ASF was initially divided into two implementation deadlines, the second of which extends through July 2010, the ASF has exhibited major weaknesses that preclude it from effective peace-enforcement, as demonstrated by its apparent ineffectiveness in Sudan(2). These weaknesses have been pointed out as including poor logistical support for mission preparation, deployment and execution, an underdeveloped organisational structure lacking unity of command, and significantly under-trained and inexperienced personnel. Another major concern is the overstretching of Africa’s military resources, given the vast number of conflict hotspots that demand an equally urgent response. There has been great difficulty in even securing additional troops to assist a poorly-staffed troop contingent of Ugandan soldiers operating in arguably one of the most dangerous conflicts in the world - Somalia. Given these circumstances will enough troops be available to serve the requirements of the ASF?

Another crucial aspect that warrants attention towards the deployment of a fully-functioning and viable ASF relates to the ability to conduct Chapter VII operations. An African Standby Force should consist of soldiers that also possess war fighting capabilities. Far too often, intervening forces are deployed to a Chapter VII environment with Chapter VI authority. This leaves soldiers virtually helpless to counter-act brutal attacks on civilian populations(3). The inability to act against impunity by rebels and armed forces committing atrocities will severely undermine the credibility of an ASF. In this respect the architects of the ASF will have to create a durable and sustainable solution to Africa’s plethora of peacekeeping needs.

The defence of the African continent has never been more urgent, yet an ineffective African Standby Force, incapable of responding to these challenges will denude the continent of one its most valuable instruments created to date. The attacks witnessed against the defenders and guarantors of peace in Darfur should serve as a startling reminder to policymakers and peacekeepers alike that the crucial goal of peace has not yet been attained and indeed remains threatened by gross violence, conflict and instability.