From Rhetoric to Rapid Reaction: The Consequences of the AU Intervention in the Comoros
By GERRIE SWART (1)
On 25 March, the Indian Ocean archipelago nation of the Comoros announced that it had captured the capital and airport of the rebel island of Anjouan in an African Union-backed seaborne assault. With 1,350 AU troops in support, the national government hopes to quickly topple Anjouan's local leader, French-trained former gendarme Mohamed Bacar, who has clung to power since an illegal election last year and commands a militia of several hundred. Analysts say the AU may be hoping to score a relatively easy victory in Anjouan - whose population is just 300,000 - to earn some international prestige to offset the struggles of its peacekeeping missions in Sudan and Somalia. This is perhaps the most significant act by the AU since its inception in 2002 and could possibly signal a greater willingness to intervene in those African countries where political instability, violence and renegade leaders and regimes threaten long-term peace and security.
The intervention and its possible aftermath will likely lead to greater debate and attention being focused on the common defence and security policy that the AU has attempted to craft in response to dealing with mutual threats to peace and security.
The solemn declaration on a common African defence and security policy in Sirte, Libya in 2004 asserts that:
“The adoption of a Common Defence and Security Policy for Africa is premised on a common African perception of what is required to be done collectively by African States to ensure that Africa’s common defence and security interests and goals, especially as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, are safeguarded in the face of common threats to the continent as a whole…” (2)
The declaration further notes that:
“Common Security Threats may be deemed to pose a danger to the common defence and security interests of the continent, as defined above, when such threats confront all, some, or one of the countries or regions of the continent...”
Common intra-state conflicts and tensions include unconstitutional changes of government, the improper conduct of electoral processes as well as situations which prevent and undermine the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, popular participation and good governance.
In the same document reference is also made to common external threats to continental security, which include external aggression, such as the invasion of an African country and crises with adverse effects on African regional security. The principles and values informing the Common African Defence and Security Policy also include the prohibition on the use of force among Member States of the Union. In the same context however the declaration also notes:
“the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly, in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as a serious threat to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability to the Member States of the Union, upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council… the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security…”
It is apparent that the AU-intervention took place with the blessing and support of the Comoros Government, who clearly believed that it faced a clear and present danger from the renegade gendarme. It is however also clear that there is likely to be great debate, division and dissent amongst AU leaders on the intervention and the likely repercussions this will have.
South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki has lamented the invasion and his and other leader’s dissatisfaction with this decision could perhaps signal a split amongst the leadership in the AU on key sections contained within the common defence and security policy. Perhaps the gravest implication of the AU-backed and sanctioned invasion is the significance for other African countries, facing similar rebellions and renegade leaders and how to deal with these threats.
The Comoros invasion, whether warranted or ill-conceived has now set a precedent for similar AU actions in the future. The greatest concern should be whether the AU will adopt a consistent and objective means of evaluating crises situations that will warrant similar AU intervention as witnessed in the Comoros. There are many other African countries with equal if not graver crisis situations where the AU has not been implementing similar pressure or visible military assistance to show commitment to rapidly resolving the crisis. The Common Defence and Security Policy has also revealed many conflicting objectives, ideals and definitions that appear subject to interpretation.
The Comoros intervention has therefore unleashed a Pandora’s Box.
Should the AU have the responsibility to protect in defiance of the whims and self-interests of the regime, where clear human rights violations are taking place? Should it act or simply react when called upon to do so? Should intervention only be considered when major conflict has already laid waste to peace and security? Has the Comoros intervention signalled a radical departure in the AU’s policy of intervention? Will pre-emption now form a critical component of African peacekeeping and conflict resolution?
NOTES:
(1) Gerrie Swart is Head Researcher: Conflict & Terrorism Unit. He is also a lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, and a Research Associate with the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria (gerrie.swart@consultancyafrica.com).
(2) Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, Sirte, Libya, 28 February 2004.
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