Nigeria - a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the world's 8th largest oil producer - has enough high-quality crude in the ground to pump more than 3 million barrels per day. It is now producing only four-fifths that amount, as virtually all of the oil is located in or around the Niger Delta, a densely populated, marshy region along Nigeria's southern coastline. For several years, this area has been plagued by militant groups demanding that locals receive a larger share of oil revenue, as well as criminal organisations that steal oil directly from local pipelines.

This province accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of over 2.46 million barrels, most of which goes to the United States and other Western oil-importing countries. However, the oil-rich Niger Delta is also paradoxically one of the least developed and conflict-ridden areas of Nigeria and hardly a day goes by without reports in the media on the growing insurgency by armed militias in the province.

The roots of the Niger Delta conflict lie in the history of the struggles for self‐determination, local autonomy and democracy of the ethnic minorities in the region, which goes as far back as the second decade of the 20th century. By the 1970’s the Niger Delta had become the main source of oil, the new fiscal basis of the Nigerian State (replacing agriculture), accounting for over 80% of national revenues and 90% of export earnings.

Resource Conflict

The discourse of the causes of conflict in post‐Cold War Africa has been characterised by various perspectives. Of note is what may be described as a “rational choice” or “war economies” school of thought based on an econometric intervention to the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate over the causes of war. In the 1990’s the new political economy of war generated some controversy and vigorous debates. It was based on the position that, “economic considerations often shape the calculations and behaviour of parties to a conflict, giving rise to a particular war economy”(2). Furthermore, the debate on the oil‐development nexus in Africa is often predicated on the view that oil breeds corruption, poor governance, human rights abuses and violent conflict (3). Many of the poorest and most troubled states in the developing world have, paradoxically, high levels of natural resource wealth. Resource wealth may thus harm a country’s prospects for development.

According to a 2007 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, armed militant groups operating in the Niger Delta have graduated to a new level of lethality and technical and tactical sophistication. The report further estimates that the availability of AK‐47 weapons in the Niger Delta has increased five‐fold in the last two to three years and militant groups likely possess remote‐detonation and night‐vision equipment, as well as anti-aircraft missiles. The report paints a picture of state failure in the Niger Delta.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) first publically materialised in Nigeria in 2006, with far‐reaching global ramifications. The group has effectively been able to attract international attention to the plight of the Ijaw people and its resistance campaign through the kidnapping of foreign oil workers and demonstrating the inability of Nigerian security forces to stop its attacks, as well as the sabotage of oil installations and the effective use of the global news media. It has however, gained most attention internationally, by its threats to cripple Nigeria’s oil exports. It appears that MEND’s dissatisfaction is aimed against the Government, which has been held responsible for the pillage and pollution of the Niger Delta. Unlike previous armed groups that acted nominally as ethnic militias, MEND multiplied its firepower by welcoming all ethnic groups into its fold.

Oil has largely brought about escalating violence in the Niger Delta, which in 2006 resulted in the cutting of Nigeria’s oil exports by 25% and a revenue loss estimated to be around US$ 4.4 billion. The conflict in the Delta costs the country's treasury billions each year, and in recent months, it has been digging into its considerable cash reserves to sustain a sinking currency and to stabilise a struggling economy. To control unrest and boost production, the Government has adopted strategies ranging from direct negotiation with the militants to all-out military assaults on them. However, these methods have not been successful. Nigeria’s Government recently offered a 60-day amnesty to militants willing to trade their weapons for promises of immunity from prosecution and access to vocational training.

However, this is not the first time the Government has offered amnesty. In 2004, the Federal and local governments paid militants US$ 2,800 for each surrendered weapon, regardless of quality or condition. At the time, a relatively new AK-47 cost about US$ 350. The decision of the Federal Government to offer amnesty again could possibly be due to an intense military offensive in May 2009, which drove armed groups from the western Delta, and also made refugees of large numbers of civilians. Having scored a military victory, state officials claim, now is the time to offer members an incentive not to carry on the fight.

Amnesty

In August 2009, President Umaru Yar’Adua announced the commencement of amnesty programme saying that the time was right for those who have carried arms to drop them and embrace peace. He also emphasised that the Government would be sincere with the general pardon being floated. The general amnesty extended to all militants in the Niger Delta, which expired in October 2009, has thus far led to the laying down of arms and a tentative return of peace as more than 8,000 militants have disarmed and taken the amnesty offer. MEND has refused to participate in the amnesty, but several top commanders and their men laid down their arms. Those commanders were promptly replaced by the group.

On 15 July 2009, the militant group had declared a 60-day cease-fire saying the Government had met one of its demands by releasing ailing rebel leader Henry Okah. In mid-September 2009 the group extended its cease-fire by one month, saying it hoped the truce would help facilitate talks with the Government. Following this, conflicting reports have come from MEND. While initially the group vowed to resume attacks following the expiration of the cease-fire, the seemingly latest news indicates the adoption of an indefinite cease-fire following discussions between Yar’Adua and Okah.

The Government has budgeted for approximately 20,000 youths to participate in the vocational training programme, and many will line up to take advantage of the benefits on offer. However, the amnesty and post-amnesty period has faced many challenges, because the Government does not enjoy much credibility in the Niger Delta region, having failed for more than a decade to address the area's extreme poverty, and because the militants have good reason to accept the terms and to regroup to fight again.

Yar’Adua has said, however, that the amnesty deal has brought peace to the Niger Delta. Nonetheless, oil companies are reluctant to celebrate the “success” of the Government’s amnesty deal even though output levels from the Niger Delta rose by more than 200,000 barrels per day, with the resumption of operations in some fields that were previously closed.

Post-amnesty Niger Delta

Some critics of the amnesty deal have said that the situation post-amnesty could present any of the following: a more determined and more lethal MEND; the emergence of a splintered MEND; or a weakened MEND no longer causing chaos in the Delta. From all indications, however, the first and second scenarios are more likely. Their target will remain the Federal Government and the multinational oil companies and beyond that, there is the possibility of the formation and rise of other groups.

The goal of the Federal Government and those with vested interests in the country should now be focussed on durable peace - efforts and genuine commitments that are geared toward justice and fairness and which prevents or dissuade the reoccurrence of hostility and low intensity conflict. The root cause of the conflict has to be genuinely addressed through institution rebuilding, as well as through economic rearrangement and political transformation of the political space and landscape.

Unfortunately, this has not been done to date and is not likely to be done anytime soon, because the various powerhouses in the country seem to prefer the current status quo. The focus now, post-amnesty, should be on redressing economic, political and social injustices that the people have been subjected to by the military and the north. It should be about restructuring the system that deprives bonafide owners the right to the use of their land, mineral and human resources first and foremost for their own development. Lastly, the post-amnesty programme cannot be completed without empowering the Niger-Delta youth economically, and this should be achieved primarily through the creation of mass employment in the area, as a means of human development and stemming the flow of violence in the area.

NOTES:

(1)Angela Kariuki is an Analyst in Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Africa Watch Unit
( This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it ).
(2) Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler (2001). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, The World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance.htm
(3) Obi, C. “Oil and Development in Africa: Some Lessons from the Oil Factor in Nigeria for the Sudan”, in Luke Patey (ed.), Oil Development in Africa: Lessons for Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies Report No. 8, 2007.